🌍 China vs. US: A New World Order? 💥
Asia
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Beijing is actively expanding its diplomatic outreach while pursuing leadership roles in selected areas as Washington reduces its engagement with international institutions. On 02/02/2026, Yuchen Li in Taipei reported that Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Beijing, advocating for an “equal and orderly multipolar world.” Analysts note a narrowing power gap between China and the United States, with China’s influence growing across Asia, Africa, and Latin America through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite economic resilience – including 5% growth in 2025 – Beijing seeks to diminish US influence, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, demonstrated by intensified military activity around Taiwan and the South China Sea. This strategic shift, combined with coordinated voting patterns at the United Nations, reflects a broader effort to reshape the global landscape, though deep-seated mistrust persists.
China’s Strategic Shift: Reshaping the Global Order Amid US Disengagement
As Washington scales back its involvement in international institutions, Beijing is aggressively pursuing a strategy of diplomatic outreach and leadership roles in select areas, signaling a deliberate effort to reshape the global order. This shift is fueled by a perception of waning US influence and a desire to assert China’s role as a stabilizing power, particularly in contrast to what Beijing characterizes as “hegemonism” by the United States. The strategic repositioning is deeply rooted in a calculated approach to maintain the Communist Party’s power. In January 2026, just as the United States announced its withdrawal from 66 multilateral organizations, China hosted leaders from Canada, Finland, and Britain. During a meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer on January 29th, Chinese leader Xi Jinping explicitly called for “efforts to ‘build an equal and orderly multipolar world,’” a message that, while not new to China’s diplomatic rhetoric, has become increasingly pronounced due to the US’s disengagement. The core of this strategy is to counter the perception of American dominance and establish a more balanced international system. The Chinese government’s primary objective is to ensure the continued survival of the Communist Party. The US’s retreat from climate change initiatives, labor, and migration policies – areas President Donald Trump had labeled “woke” and contrary to US interests – has further emboldened China’s efforts. A recent international survey revealed that respondents across 21 countries, including 10 from the European Union, anticipate a growing global influence for China over the next decade. Claus Soong, an analyst at the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), noted, “The power gap [between China and the US] was much clearer in the past… but now it’s getting closer and closer.” China’s economic performance, with 5% growth in 2025 and a record trade surplus, has been a key factor in bolstering this perception. This growth is largely driven by exports to non-US markets, particularly across Southeast Asia. However, the strategy is not without risks, as China has scaled back massive infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to mitigate financial risks and concerns about debt burdens by partner countries.
The Global South as a Cornerstone of China’s Strategy
Central to China’s global strategy is the cultivation of support from the Global South – developing and emerging economies worldwide. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, exemplifies this approach, aiming to expand China’s influence across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Soong emphasized that “A leader needs followers to support or to justify its leadership,” and that securing support from the Global South is “the breaking point” for China in the face of Western containment. China’s economic data, including 5% growth in 2025 and a record trade surplus, was presented as evidence of this strategy’s success. However, concerns remain about the sustainability of China's economic growth and the potential for debt burdens within the BRI framework.
Selective Engagement and Institutional Positioning
China’s approach is characterized by selective engagement, rather than a wholesale takeover of US-led institutions. Analysts believe Beijing’s ultimate goal is not to replace the US-led world order but to maintain its influence within strategically vital regions. For instance, despite the exclusion of Taiwan within the World Health Organization (WHO) – a point frequently cited by the US during the 2019 COVID-19 pandemic – China remains committed to influencing the organization’s agenda. Similarly, China’s intensified military activity around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, where tensions with the Philippines over territorial claims are high, demonstrates a focus on asserting control in the Asia-Pacific region. Mokry noted that “Beijing would be extremely pleased if they could just do whatever they want in Asia,” highlighting the fundamental nature of US engagement in the region, which is “not that easy to change.”
Transactional Partnerships and Regime Survival
China’s partnerships are largely transactional, driven more by shared opposition to the US rather than by value-based alignment. Mokry emphasized that “If there’s an opportunity to portray the fact that they work together, they will obviously take it,” but that “on real substance, there is still deep-seated mistrust.” This approach is rooted in the fundamental objective of regime survival. As an example, Mokry referenced Trump’s first presidency (2016-2020) and the parallel withdrawal from international organizations, noting that China refrained from claiming leadership roles, prioritizing the continuity of the Communist Party. Soong echoed this sentiment, stating that “It’s not a take-over-the-world kind of ambition,” underscoring the core driver of China’s global strategy: the preservation of the Communist Party’s power.
This article is AI-synthesized from public sources and may not reflect original reporting.